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07 March
2003
RACE AGAINST TIME
Defining What Iraq Has To Do Before War Comes
WAR PLAN IRAQ Update Number 12 |
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THE RACE AGAINST TIME
The rejection of a bill to allow US access to Turkish bases by
the Turkish parliament has thrown US war plans into turmoil. 'The
surprise rejection by the parliament in Ankara made the planning
"more complicated", Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman,
said. Some military analysts predicted that an attack of the speed
and decisiveness President George Bush wants might have to be
delayed until late March or even early April.' (Independent,
4 Mar., p.1)
'Even if the troops of the US 4th Mechanised Infantry Division
were to be allowed into Turkey, they would probably need at least
two to three weeks before they were ready to fight. With the parliamentary
delays, that could postpone the launch of an invasion of Iraq
well into April.' (Independent, 5 Mar., p. 4)
If the planned start of war is being delayed into April, this
would have two significant effects: the war would be scheduled
to take place in the much hotter weather of April, and it would
be scheduled to take place after AFTER 27 Mar., the deadline for
the UN weapons inspectors to define Iraqs "key remaining
disarmament tasks".
In other words, it would take place just after
UN weapons inspectors had started the properly-laid
down process of verified disarmament in Iraq.
This would make war politically impossible.
Thus the pressure to find alternative strategies: 'Instead, planners
are looking at much riskier alternatives, including an airborne
assault on Mosul and Kirkuk or switching the 4th Infantry Division
to Kuwait, from where they would be asked to make a long and dangerous
dash around Baghdad to reach Republican Guard divisions protecting
President Saddams home region of Tikrit.' (Independent,
5 Mar., p. 4) It's not clear that the delay can be avoided.
60 DAYS TO DEFINE KEY DISARMAMENT TASKS
The proper timetable for disarmament was set out in UN Security
Council Resolution 1284, passed in Dec. 1999 (which also created
the inspection agency UNMOVIC - UN Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commissionheaded by Dr Hans Blix).
Para. 7 of Resolution 1284 says that UNMOVIC and the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency, which handles nuclear disarmament in Iraq),
'will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work
programme for the discharge of their mandates.' This
will be done 'not later than 60 days after they have both
started work in Iraq.'
This work programme will include 'the key remaining disarmament
tasks to be completed by Iraq': 'what is required
of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined
and precise.' (You can find Resolution 1284 at <www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/>.)
WAR COULD HAVE BEEN DE-RAILED IN JANUARY
As the weapons inspectors returned to Iraq on 27 Nov. 2002, one
would have expected them to present their work programme on 27
Jan.
If this had been done, and if the 'key remaining disarmament tasks'
had been defined on that day, we probably wouldn't be talking
about a war right now, because it would be very hard for the US
to shut down an open-ended disarmament process with clearly defined
benchmarks for measuring the progress of Iraqi disarmament. There
would be tasks still not yet dealt with.
Importantly, Resolution 1284 does not set a deadline for inspectors
to finish their work in Iraq. The reason there are no deadlines
for disarmament is that when Britain and the US drew up the Resolution,
they wanted a way of stringing out the inspection process in order
to string out the economic sanctions on Iraq.
Then, they wanted inspectors to have all the
time in the world. Now, they want the inspectors
rolled up ASAP.
AN EXTRAORDINARY AND FATEFUL DELAY
The 'key disarmament tasks' weren't defined on 27 Jan. War wasnt
derailed. For a very peculiar reason. UNMOVIC spokesperson Ewen
Buchanan, interviewed by ARROW on 24 Feb. 2003, explained that
although inspectors had returned to Iraq on 27 Nov. and started
doing things (clearing up the long- deserted office, carrying
out inspections, etc.), it had decided not to define this as 'starting
work', but as a 'build-up period'. The inspectors had decided
to define the 'starting of work' as 27 Jan. This meant the 60
day deadline moved back another 60 days, so that the key remaining
disarmament tasks now have to be defined by 27 Mar. instead of
27 Jan.
What made this decision so very very strange was that UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 asked the inspectors 'to resume inspections
no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution' on
8 Nov. So if the inspectors had been consistent, they would have
failed this test, because they they only 'started work' (in the
sense of Resolution 1284) on 27 Jan. They got around this by deciding
that they had 'resumed inspections' (but not started work) in
Iraq within the required 45 days. Mr Buchanan acknowledged that
you could say the inspectors were 'having their cake and eating
it'. When the inspectors looked at themselves through 1284 spectacles,
they started work at the end of Jan. 2003. When they looked at
themselves through 1441 glasses, they 'resumed inspections' before
mid-Dec. 2002.
US INTERFERENCE SUSPECTED
It is hard to believe that the inspectors came up with this contorted
logic all by themselves. It is extremely hard to believe that
the inspectors were not pressured to define the two start dates
differently by the superpower which was intent on going to war
with Iraq by mid-Mar. 2003, and which therefore needed to make
sure the disarmament process mandated by Resolution 1284 was kicked
into the long grass beyond any likely date for
the start of war.
ANOTHER TWIST TO THE TALE
Let's go back to Resolution 1284. Para. 33 states that the Security
Council will, after four months of verified cooperation with disarmament,
suspend economic sanctions on Iraq on a rolling basis, 'with the
fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation
in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Councils resolutions'.
The clock starts ticking on this once the Security
Council 'is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA
that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification
[OMV] is fully operational.' This OMV system itself cannot become
'fully operational' until its design has been approved as part
of the 'work programme' agreed by the Security Council.
So the schedule should go like this: by 27 Mar.,
the Security Council approved a long-term system which can continuously
monitor Iraq's capacity to make weapons of mass destruction and
ensure that these factories and facilities are used only for civilian
purposes. Then UNMOVIC and the IAEA set up the system. Once its
'fully operational', the clock is ticking. If Iraq 'has cooperated
in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA' (para. 33 again) for
four months after OMV goes 'fully operational', economic sanctions
are suspended (in July or Aug.). (From Iraq's point of view, the
phrase 'cooperated in all respects' has a lethal vagueness. It
means trusting the US and UK to recognise and reward a high level
of cooperation.)
THE FRENCH PROPOSAL
France, with Russian and German support, has proposed the implementation
of Resolution 1284: the definition of 'key remaining disarmament
tasks', the setting up of the OMV system, and following the four-
month schedule laid down in the Resolution. (24 Feb. 2003, <http://www.un.int/france/>)
Mr Blair was furious: 'This is not a road to peace
but folly and weakness that means conflict, when it comes, will
be greater in its devastation.' So if the inspectors carry out
a process of verified disarmament in Iraq, this means that Iraq
wil be able to carry out 'greater devastation' in the future.
'The issue is not time. The issue is will.' By
which Mr Blair meant Iraq's willingness to disarm, rather than
US determination to go to war. (Independent, 26 Feb.,
p. 2)
THE CHOICE BETWEEN WAR AND DISARMAMENT
At the time of writing, the US and UK are giving up on their draft
resolution (Briefing 34 Last Push For War critiques that draft),
and trying an amendment with a deadline: In London, officials
indicated the ultimatum would be short - measured in days rather
than weeks - and would make clear that if Mr Hussein failed to
disarm he would face the consequences. (FT, 7 Mar.)
'The US and its allies are, however, said to be unenthusiastic
about setting explicit benchmarks to measure Iraqi ompliance,
an idea recently floated in a Canadian attempt to broker a compromise.
They fear Mr Hussein could comply with specific demands while
retaining his overall weapons capability.' (FT, 7 Mar.)
In other words, if the UN says clearly (as it should do under
Resolution 1284) what Iraq has to do to prove it has disarmed
its weapons of mass destruction, there is a danger that Iraq might
just do those things, and prove it has disarmed. If the US can
no longer move the goalposts, it might not be able to carry out
a war which it desires regardless of Iraqs weapons status.
The US military is racing to start a war before 27 Mar. despite
the fact that the logistics are currently unfavourable (courtesy
the Turkish anti-war movement). The rest of the world is racing
to force the Security Council to implement Resolution 1284, and
to start the verified disarmament process in Iraq by defining
the 'key remaining disarmament tasks.' All voices should be raised
to support this process, which may be the only way to derail war.
BOOK
War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Why We Shouldnt Launch Another War
Against Iraq by Milan Rai
'An excellent weapon for all those opposed to Bush's war'. Tariq
Ali
'Excellent'. Alice Mahon MP
'Required reading for anyone concerned about the risk of war'.
Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford School of Peace Studies
'Timely and important'. Hilary Wainwright
£10 plus £1.80 p&p.
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